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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3928 
 ___________ 
 
 MEI YU WANG-HUANG, 
 
        Petitioner 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A078-952-405) 
 Immigration Judge:  R.K. Malloy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 16, 2012 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: May 18, 2012) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Mei Yu Wang-Huang, a citizen of China, was placed in removal proceedings after 
entering the United States without admission or parole.  To block her removal, Wang-
Huang applied for asylum and related relief, claiming, inter alia, that in China she was 
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both subjected to a forced abortion and fined 10,000 yuan for having violated that 
country’s coercive family planning policy.  An immigration judge found that Wang-
Huang lacked credibility and denied her applications for relief.  The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) summarily affirmed and denied reconsideration.  The 
subsequent petition for review was dismissed by our Clerk of Court under LAR 107.2(b) 
because Wang-Huang’s attorney failed to file a brief.  See Wang-Huang v. Att’y Gen.
 Years later, Wang-Huang filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings.  The BIA 
gave three reasons for denying the motion:  (1) it was untimely; (2) it did not satisfy the 
exception to the limitations period, found in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); and (3) it was not 
accompanied by a new asylum application, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).  This 
petition for review followed.
, 
No. 05-1836 (order entered on August 3, 2005).  
1
 We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wang-Huang’s 
motion to reopen.  As a preliminary matter, we note that Wang-Huang does not suggest 
that her motion was timely filed.  
   
See
                                                 
1  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Kucana v. Holder, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 
827, 840 (2010).  We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to 
reopen.  See Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011).  “We give the BIA’s 
decision broad deference and generally do not disturb it unless it is ‘arbitrary, irrational, 
or contrary to law.’”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing for a ninety-day 
limitations period).  She instead contends that the documents submitted to the BIA satisfy 
the exception to the limitations period based on previously unavailable, material evidence 
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of changed circumstances in China.  See
 Wang-Huang does not contest the BIA’s determination that her putative asylum 
claim is successive.  
 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Those documents 
are Wang-Huang’s self-written, unsworn affidavit and an unsworn letter from her teenage 
daughter in China, purporting to show that interest has accrued on Wang-Huang’s still-
unpaid fine and that family planning officials have threatened to “take away” Wang-
Huang’s daughter if the old fine remains unpaid.   
See Pet’r Br. at 15 (“Wang-Huang clearly indicated in her motion 
[to reopen] that she was relying on the claim articulated in her 2003 [asylum] application 
. . . .”).  A successive asylum claim underlying an untimely motion to reopen must be 
supported by new evidence reflecting that current circumstances in China are different 
from those extant at the time of the removal proceedings.  Liu v. Att’y Gen.
 In addition, it is noteworthy that Wang-Huang’s original claim was denied on 
adverse-credibility grounds.  Although a claim premised on an entirely new theory is not 
necessarily tainted on reopening by an earlier credibility finding, 
, 555 F.3d 
145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009).   
see Guo v. Ashcroft, 
386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004), the BIA may reasonably expect an alien who is 
proceeding on reopening with the very same theory to make an attempt to rehabilitate her 
credibility.  See, e.g., Zhang v, Mukasey, 543 F.3d 851, 855 (6th Cir. 2008); Lemus v. 
Gonzales
 Here, Wang-Huang’s motion to reopen did nothing to rehabilitate her credibility.  
Furthermore, the BIA specifically noted that neither of the new statements accompanying 
, 489 F.3d 399, 401 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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her motion was “signed under penalt[y] of perjury.”  J.A. at 3.  The BIA had reason to 
doubt the authenticity of the statements, given that Wang-Huang was found to have 
submitted fabricated evidence to the IJ during the original removal proceedings.  But 
even if the facts presented in Wang-Huang’s motion to reopen were accepted as true, see 
Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007), the BIA nevertheless did not 
abuse its discretion by holding that circumstances in China have, for the purpose of her 
asylum claim, only persisted, not meaningfully worsened.  Cf. Pllumi
 As for Wang-Huang’s failure to submit to the BIA a new asylum application, she 
argues that doing so “was not necessary.”  Pet’r Br. at 15.  That explanation is 
unpersuasive in light of BIA precedent holding that the “failure to submit an application 
for relief, as required by [8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)], will typically result in the Board’s 
denial of the motion.”  
, 642 F.3d at 161.   
In re Yewondwosen, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1025, 1026 (BIA 1997) (en 
banc); see also Jiang v. Holder, 639 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 2011); Liu v. Holder, 560 
F.3d 485, 491 (6th Cir. 2009); Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 
2008); Palma-Mazariegos v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 144, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (per curiam); 
Waggoner v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2007).  We also note that the 
pertinent portion of the regulation is phrased in mandatory language:  “A motion to 
reopen . . . must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all 
supporting documentation.”  (emphasis added).  The BIA’s enforcement of the technical 
requirements for filing motions to reopen—where the alien’s noncompliance is 
admitted—surely does not constitute an abuse of discretion.  
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For the reasons given in this opinion, the petition for review will be denied. 
